ConnectWise Cloud Backup Supply-Chain Attack: Compromised Service Principals Breach Hundreds of Microsoft 365 Tenants
On October 17, 2026, IT and Managed Service Provider (MSP) software powerhouse ConnectWise took the drastic step of suspending its Cloud Backup platform (formerly SkyKick Cloud Backup) and revoking certificates across seven core multi-tenant Microsoft Entra ID application identities. The emergency shutdown followed joint discoveries by Huntress, Inforcer, and Microsoft Threat Intelligence that threat actors had compromised a master vendor credential tied to ConnectWise’s multi-tenant backup service principal, using it to systematically authenticate into hundreds of downstream customer Microsoft 365 environments beginning October 15, 2026.
Mechanics of the Supply-Chain Intrusion: App-Only OAuth Abuse
To perform automated cloud-to-cloud backups of Exchange Online mailboxes, SharePoint Online sites, OneDrive for Business folders, and Microsoft Teams chats, SaaS backup vendors register multi-tenant Enterprise Applications in Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). When an MSP onboards a client tenant, a Global Administrator grants tenant-wide admin consent to the vendor’s service principal.
[Compromised Vendor Vault]
|
| Extracts Master Client Secret / X.509 Private Key for AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae
v
[Microsoft Entra ID Token Endpoint: login.microsoftonline.com/{tenant_id}/oauth2/v2.0/token]
|
| grant_type=client_credentials (App-Only Flow -> Bypasses User MFA & Conditional Access!)
v
[Issued Access Token with Pre-Consented Application Scopes]
- Mail.ReadWrite / full_access_as_app
- Files.ReadWrite.All
- Sites.FullControl.All
- Directory.ReadWrite.All
- RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory
Because the authentication flow uses grant_type=client_credentials (Service Principal authentication) rather than interactive user sign-ins, standard user Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and user-scoped Conditional Access policies are completely bypassed. Armed with the master application credential for the primary SkyKick/ConnectWise backup app (506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae) and six adjacent ConnectWise M365 management identities, the adversary only needed a list of customer Tenant IDs (GUIDs) to mint valid Microsoft Graph API access tokens for any consented organization.
Sorted-GUID Automated Enumeration
Forensic analysis across MSP fleets revealed a striking operational signature: the threat actor executed an automated Python/Go enumeration script that iterated through compromised customer tenants in strictly sorted hexadecimal Tenant GUID order (starting from 00... and progressing sequentially toward ff...). Upon authenticating into each tenant, the script queried directory roles, enumerated administrative users, and in select high-value targets, attempted to register rogue credentials or elevate permissions before ConnectWise severed the central certificates on October 17.
Detection Telemetry & Microsoft Sentinel KQL Hunting Queries
// Hunt for anomalous Service Principal sign-ins & Graph activity from ConnectWise/SkyKick AppIds
let CompromisedAppIds = dynamic([
"506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae", // Primary Cloud Backup / SkyKick AppId
"beffc098-b1fc-42c2-91f2-a8d2c2e11120", // Related SkyKick/CW M365 Management App
"d326c1c9-093a-478a-97d9-7252f59f9681" // Related CW SaaS Security / Exchange App
]);
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-14T00:00:00Z)
| where AppId in (CompromisedAppIds) or ServicePrincipalName has_any ("SkyKick", "ConnectWise", "CloudBackup")
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize
SignInCount = count(),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated),
DistinctIPs = make_set(IPAddress),
ResourcesAccessed = make_set(ResourceDisplayName)
by TenantId, ServicePrincipalName, AppId, ServicePrincipalId
| extend HasAnomalousIP = iff(array_length(DistinctIPs) > 2, "HIGH_RISK_MULTI_IP", "REVIEW_REQUIRED")
| order by FirstSeen ascAdministrators should also audit the Entra ID AuditLogs table to verify whether the compromised service principal modified directory roles or added rogue client secrets to other internal applications during its access window:
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-10-14T00:00:00Z)
| where tostring(InitiatedBy.app.appId) == "506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae"
or tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName) has_any ("SkyKick", "ConnectWise")
| where OperationName has_any (
"Add service principal",
"Update application – Certificates and secrets management",
"Add member to role",
"Add app role assignment to service principal"
)
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, InitiatedBy, TargetResources, Result
Remediation & Tenant Hardening Playbook
- Verify Revocation & Disable Legacy Enterprise Apps: Navigate to Microsoft Entra Admin Center → Identity → Applications → Enterprise applications. Locate all seven ConnectWise Cloud Backup / SkyKick application identities. Ensure "Enabled for users to sign-in" is set to No until ConnectWise issues newly rotated, cryptographically isolated application identities.
- Purge Unauthorized OAuth Grants (
OAuth2PermissionGrants): Use Microsoft Graph PowerShell (Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignedTo) to audit all application permissions held by third-party MSP tools and revoke stale or over-privileged consents (such asRoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory, which a backup tool should rarely hold permanently). - Deploy Conditional Access for Workload Identities: Utilize Microsoft Entra ID Workload Identity Premium to enforce strict Trusted Location IP allowlisting on third-party vendor Service Principals. Even if a vendor’s master client secret is leaked, token requests originating outside the vendor's published ASN/egress IP ranges will be blocked at the Entra token endpoint.