Unmasking TeamPCP: How OSINT and Leaked Credentials Deanonymized the 'Shai-Hulud' Supply Chain Hacker

A forensic investigation has unmasked the operator behind TeamPCP and the Shai-Hulud supply chain worms as Ruben Thomson of Perth, Australia. Here is the full breakdown of the OPSEC blunders, C2 infrastructure, and transitive build-pipeline attacks.

Unmasking TeamPCP: How OSINT and Leaked Credentials Deanonymized the 'Shai-Hulud' Supply Chain Hacker

In what has become one of the most significant cybercrime deanonymizations of the year, forensic investigators have unmasked the threat actor behind TeamPCP — the notorious cybercrime entity responsible for the Mini-Shai-Hulud npm worm, the Megalodon 5,500-repository GitHub compromise, and backdoored releases of Aqua Trivy, KICS, and Bitwarden CLI. The operator behind the alias DeadCatx3 has been identified as Ruben Thomson, operating out of Perth, Western Australia.

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Threat Actor Profile & Investigation Summary: Actor Identity / Pseudonym: Ruben Thomson / DeadCatx3 / YolocrownZ / PCP.sh Group Affiliation: TeamPCP (Software Supply Chain & CI/CD Intrusion Syndicate) Primary Operations: Trivy CI/CD backdoor, TanStack Mini-Shai-Hulud worm, Megalodon GitHub repo tampering, poisoned VS Code marketplace extensions. Attribution Vectors: HackerOne account, Hugging Face C2 disclosure (masscan[.]cloud), infostealer credential reuse, TikTok / Steam gaming handles, and Telegram avatar correlation. Status: Deanonymized with findings confirmed by federal law enforcement.

The Rise of TeamPCP: From Monero Miners to Supply Chain Leviathan

TeamPCP's trajectory represents a masterclass in the weaponization of transitive trust across modern software development ecosystems. While the group originated as an opportunistic scanning collective targeting misconfigured cloud containers to deploy cryptocurrency miners, their tactical pivot in early 2026 caused widespread panic across DevSecOps teams globally.

Rather than compromising production servers directly, TeamPCP realized that security tooling running inside continuous integration (CI/CD) build pipelines holds more privileged API keys, cloud tokens, and registry secrets than the underlying application servers themselves.

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TeamPCP's Signature Supply Chain Campaigns: Trivy & KICS Pipeline Tampering: Hijacking Aqua Security GitHub release tags to inject infostealers into vulnerability scanning binaries executed during automated CI builds. The TanStack "Mini-Shai-Hulud" Worm: Uploading 84 malicious releases across 42 @tanstack/* packages in npm within a 6-minute window, exfiltrating developer credentials to masscan[.]cloud while evading SLSA provenance guarantees. Megalodon GitHub Compromise: Backdooring over 5,561 public and private GitHub repositories by leveraging CI credentials harvested from developer infostealer logs. Poisoned VS Code Marketplace Extensions: Distributing malicious IDE utilities that exfiltrated source code repositories directly from developer workstations.

The Forensic Investigation: How the Breadcrumb Trail Unraveled

Despite crafting stealthy malware worms and cloaking operational payloads behind legitimate open-source licenses, TeamPCP made a series of catastrophic operational security (OPSEC) blunders that allowed threat intelligence researchers at Flare and collaborating law enforcement agencies to reconstruct an unbroken attribution chain.

1. The HackerOne and Hugging Face Footprint

The investigation began by querying the core developer alias associated with early TeamPCP toolsets: DeadCatx3. OSINT indexing across multiple platforms revealed a registered HackerOne bug bounty profile containing the operator's real name: Ruben Thomson.

A corresponding profile on Hugging Face using the initials "RT" and handle DeadCatX3 contained a decisive technical link: the bio explicitly listed the domain masscan[.]cloud. Threat intelligence telemetry had previously confirmed that masscan[.]cloud served as the primary Command-and-Control (C2) endpoint for the Mini-Shai-Hulud TanStack npm worm.

2. Infostealer Credential Pivoting

Pivoting on the name yielded an educational email address associated with Thomson. Searching dark web combolists and infostealer databases revealed a plaintext password previously used with that educational account.

Running a reverse credential search on that specific password uncovered a linked personal Gmail address: [email protected].

3. The Gaming Footprint & TikTok Tie-In

Correlating accounts registered under the surfinup8 address led investigators to a TikTok account (yolosolo17) titled with Thomson's real name. The sole video uploaded to this profile documented a Steam gaming account using the handle YolocrownZ.

4. The Uncompressed Telegram Avatar Climax

The Steam account featured a profile picture displaying a cat resting in front of multiple computer monitors. Reverse image lookups across global databases returned zero hits, proving the photograph was a private, un-indexed image taken in a personal workspace.

When investigators examined historic captures of the official TeamPCP Telegram channel (PCP.sh), the channel was found using the exact same identical cat photograph as its public avatar.

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The Complete Attribution Chain: DeadCatx3 Handle → HackerOne Profile (Ruben Thomson) → Hugging Face C2 (masscan[.]cloud) → Reused Password Pivot → [email protected] → TikTok / Steam (YolocrownZ) → Private Cat Avatar Match → Official TeamPCP Telegram (PCP.sh).

Strategic Implications for AppSec & DevSecOps Teams

The deanonymization of Ruben Thomson brings a dramatic conclusion to TeamPCP's campaign, but the underlying attack surfaces they exploited remain active vectors across the software industry. Security teams must implement strict architectural controls to neutralize similar supply chain tradecraft:

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Mandatory Defensive Action Items: Pin GitHub Actions to Immutable Commit SHAs: Never reference GitHub Actions by mutable branch or release tags (e.g., @v2). Use full 40-character commit hashes to prevent poisoned release substitutions. Strict Network Egress Filtering in CI/CD Runners: Implement strict egress firewalls on build runners. Vulnerability scanners and compiler tools should never initiate outbound connections to arbitrary IP addresses or unverified endpoints. Ephemeral, Scoped Publishing Tokens: Replace long-lived PyPI and npm publishing tokens with OpenID Connect (OIDC) trusted publishing to eliminate static token theft. Continuous Infostealer & Combolist Monitoring: Proactively monitor enterprise developer identities across stealer logs, Pastebin dumps, and exposed credential databases.

For more detailed technical breakdowns on past supply chain incidents and remediation playbooks, explore ColibriSec's Technical Guides and Threat Intelligence Roundups.

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